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Introduction 
 
This paper is about a popular strategy for dealing with impasses we reach when reasoning 
together.  Instead of advising disputing parties to stop trying to reason together, we sometimes 
urge them to recognize that at some higher level of generality they can find common ground.  
We maintain that if we can get them to ascend to this common ground, they may come to see that 
they share some values, and that their dispute really stems from the fact that they interpret these 
shared values in different ways.  This recognition, we claim, may help them to understand each 
other better, and therefore to go some way towards resolving their differences.     
My claim is that this strategy is actually a high-stakes gamble in the sense that it involves 
a tacit reliance on improbable assumptions, and in the sense that it places at risk the very skills 
we employ when we reason.  In other words, as strategies go, it is fairly far-fetched and 
dangerous. 
 
 
Examples 
 
Let me very briefly mention two examples: 
 
In Life’s Dominion, Ronald Dworkin (1994; See also Warnke, 1999) elegantly argues that 
when it comes to the issue of abortion, pro-lifers and pro-choicers only seem to have radically 
incompatible views.  When we examine matters closely we find that their opposing views flow 
from the same general principle, namely, an appreciation for the sanctity of life.  Their real 
difference stems from the different ways that they interpret this shared, general principle.  The 
real question is not about whether or not a fetus is a person, it is about how best to honor the 
sanctity of life. 
In his paper, “The Ethics of Animal Research:  What are the Prospects for Agreement?”, 
David DeGrazia (1999) argues that those who oppose the use of animals in biomedical research  
and those who favor such use actually have several overarching principles in common.  They all 
agree, for example, that in the absence of competing human interests, many kinds of animals 
have interests that we ought to protect if we can.  The real question is not about whether or not 
animals have interests we ought to protect; it is about how we ought to weigh those interests 
against human interests.   
I single these examples out not because they deserve any special criticism.  In them we 
can easily see the strategy that I am talking about, a strategy that we will almost always find 
employed where the best intentions meet up with highly charged debates. 
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Reasoning Together  
 
The worry I have about this sort of approach to disagreement comes from a particular 
view about what reasoning is and how it works. (See Wright, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2002; Campolo 
and Turner, 2002.)  On this view, reasons-giving is a complex activity that depends upon a 
variety of resources and skills.  One of the resources is our general understanding of things, to 
put it roughly.  One of the skills is our ability to articulate parts of that understanding in the form 
of claims and support for those claims.  Reasoning together is, among other things, a way of 
responding to the sense that we need to repair or establish intersubjectivity.  Or to put it another 
way, it is a way of restoring or initiating purposeful coordination to our several actions or 
behaviors.  We exchange reasons, assess conclusions, to get to, or back to, a state in which we 
can go on together.  We feel compelled to reason together when something we’re doing together 
is at stake.  Whenever we discover a need to reason together the appropriate question is not 
simply “What do we do now?” but rather, “What do we do next in order to continue along 
together in the smooth manner we were enjoying before?”  Reasoning together is about figuring 
out how to proceed together beyond some interruption.  As we’ll see below, we will be quite 
limited in our joint reasoning if we cannot see ourselves as having been engaged in something 
that got interrupted.  By the same token, if we should come to see ourselves as having been 
engaged in something together when we in fact were not, we will be in just as difficult a position. 
 It is difficult to say precisely what “going on together” comes to, since togetherness is a 
rather vague idea, and “going on,” is never anything other than going on with some specific task, 
activity, project, or endeavor (or combination thereof).  Likewise, the developments—call them 
interruptions—that can lead to the feeling that we need to figure out how to go on together can 
take many forms and can be perceived in many different ways.  It helps to consider some 
examples.  The following cases are only used to illustrate some different categories of activities 
and interruptions—they’re not necessarily very realistic.  In several it should be clear that those 
involved shouldn’t place their hopes in reasoning together, but we can learn some important 
lessons about the strategy we’re considering by asking how it would go if they decided to try it 
anyway.  If the examples and thought experiments that follow suggest a plausible account of how 
reasoning works, then the concern I have in mind will become clear very quickly. 
 
Case #1 
  
Consider the most robust sort of “going on together”—a small group of people working 
closely together on some project.  They have very similar conceptions of the project in hand, and 
they share the specialized know-how and understanding relevant to the sort of thing they’re 
doing.  Their behavior is interactive and complementary.  We might say that they possess 
intersubjectivity in a very strong sense.  Of course not much of our normal behavior and 
experience finds us so closely bound up with what others are doing. But as examples that might 
approximate these degrees of interdependence and coordination think of:  surgeons working 
together on a complicated surgical procedure, a road crew installing traffic signals at an 
intersection, and baseball players executing a double play. 
 Closely interwoven activity of this sort can be disrupted in a number of ways.  Consider 
the following: 
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1a.  Imagine that two surgeons discover, in the early phases of a surgical procedure, that the test 
results on which they had based their judgment about what the patient needed were misleading.  
The planned operation no longer seems like precisely the right one.  Further, imagine that 
although they are sure that their plans require minor modifications, they cannot see immediately 
which among several available alternatives they should choose.  They are momentarily at a loss, 
their smooth interaction and coordination are disrupted, and they naturally begin a brief 
conversation aimed at selecting the best course of action to follow.  If all goes well the 
conversation will go smoothly—a short list of alternatives will materialize quickly, various pros 
and cons of the alternatives will be aired, the alternatives will be ranked (at least implicitly), and 
they will proceed to act on the best one—their ability to go on together restored. 
 If this bout of reasoning goes so well, it’s because every aspect of the conversation rests 
heavily on a very rich common understanding.  If the surgeons didn’t have very similar notions 
of what they were doing in the first place, then they would not so easily have noticed that there 
was a need to re-examine their plans.  If they could not count on being able to understand each 
other with minimal explanation, on being able to take a lot for granted in their claims and 
questions, then their conversation would have stalled immediately.  If their common training and 
experience had not inculcated in them a common sense of the range of appropriate responses to 
situations like this one, then they would not have been able to agree so quickly on a helpful list 
of alternatives.  And if they did not share the same expert judgment, they would not have been 
able to come to an agreement about the relative promise of those alternatives.  Since they are 
experts, and since their reasoning has been based at each moment on that expertise, we say of the 
solution they eventually choose not just that it is a way to go on, but that it is the way to go on, 
the right way to carry on doing what they were doing.   
  
1b.  Contrast this sort of disruption with the one the same surgeons would experience if, mid-
surgery, some important piece of medical equipment were to malfunction.  As much as in the 
earlier scenario, their surgery is interrupted, and there is every interest in figuring out how to get 
back to it.  But in this case the problem is not so clearly a surgical one.  Depending on the nature 
of the failed equipment and on the particulars of the case, they may have to choose between 
trying to complete the surgery without the equipment and trying to replace it.  If they choose the 
former, then they will have to figure out how to resume the operation under these new 
circumstances, and that is again a surgical problem.  They may engage in reasoning that rests on 
their expertise as in the previous example.  But if they decide that they need to replace the 
equipment before they can go on, their problem is no longer primarily surgical in nature.  That is, 
they won't be able to rely on their shared medical expertise to figure out how to get back to their 
medical procedure, how to restore their coordination.  It does not follow that the surgeons will be 
at a complete loss, for if they know their way around an operating room, and around a hospital, 
they will have other competences that they can rely on.  For example, we can expect them to 
have in common whatever "auxiliary" competence it is by which a surgeon requests, orders, 
finds, or in some way procures equipment needed for surgery. 
 Possessed of such auxiliary competences, and therefore being acquainted with several 
methods for obtaining the equipment they need, we might find the surgeons engaging in a brief 
consideration of each of the options, reasoning in just the way that they did in our earlier 
example.  This episode of reasoning, no less than the other, rests heavily on what they both 
understand, on what they both know how to do.  If one of the surgeons did not have these 
competences, perhaps because he was new to the hospital and its particular procedures, he would 
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be completely unable to help decide how to obtain the equipment.   
  
1c.  Consider one last kind of disruption that our surgeons might face.  Imagine that in the middle 
of their surgery they are interrupted by a hospital-wide loss of power.  After doing what they can 
to sustain their patient, they are confronted with a problem which is not only not primarily 
medical, but it doesn't even seem to fall under the "jurisdiction" of the sorts of auxiliary skills 
that we expect surgeons to have.  Nothing in their common training or experience gives them a 
sense of how to solve this sort of problem.  We would expect to find them asking, “What do we 
do now?” but we shouldn’t expect them to get very far towards an answer by exchanging and 
assessing reasons.  Suppose they decide to come up with a list of alternative methods for 
restoring power to the hospital.  Where will such alternatives come from?  And if they do 
manage to compile a short list, how will they know what to count for or against each of the 
various options?  If ever there were a case in which someone should seek outside expertise, this 
is one.  There is a correct way to restore power, but our surgeons don't know anything about it.  
Until someone else restores power to the hospital, it may be that the best they can do is to try to 
keep their patient alive.  Perhaps they’ll reason about that, but that’s a new problem.  The point is 
that they are not at all in a position to reason their way past the original interruption. 
 In this sort of case we can see especially well that reasoning together is not some sort of 
magically creative act which always produces efficacious results.  It is rather a way of drawing 
on shared resources, and as those resources get thinner, reasoning loses traction.  We can restore 
coordination by reasoning as long as we have a great deal of shared understanding and know-
how—the kind of commonality that comes from being smoothly engaged together in some 
activity.  When our activity is brought to a halt by circumstances which that activity's skill does 
not prepare us for, then we need to find some other relevant competence we share, or else try 
something besides reasoning together.   
 
Case #2  
 
Of course many of our cooperative endeavors find us working together less closely than 
surgeons.  Consider the various groups of contractors who work together to build a house.  
Plumbers, roofers, bricklayers, carpenters, electricians, and others work "together" in the sense 
that they are all working on the same project, are all partly responsible for how it turns out.  To 
some extent they depend on each other's work—roofers need the beams assembled by the 
carpenters, and so on.  They are also working in fairly close proximity, so they need to be able to 
stay out of each others' way.  In short, their activities are loosely coordinated.  Nevertheless, their 
activities are fairly distinct—they require different training, different tools, different materials, 
different methods, and they can be performed, at any given moment, independently of each 
other.   Of course, just as with those whose tasks are more closely intertwined, there can arise a 
breakdown in the coordination with which the building contractors do their jobs.  And in such 
cases they can resort to reasoning to try to restore that coordination.   
 
2a.  Imagine that in the course of building a house the various contractors find that due to some 
obscure zoning regulations the blueprints need to be altered somewhat.  Imagine further that 
while it's clear that at least some of the work that had been done will need to be "undone," there 
are several options for how to accomplish this, including demolishing the structure and starting 
over.  In any case, the new plans will require a whole new set of protocols, a new scheduling of 
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tasks, a new and different list of tasks to be done.  In the face of all of these options there is real 
uncertainty about how to proceed.  Such a situation would certainly represent a break in the 
coordination the contractors had previously enjoyed.  On the surface, the situation resembles that 
of the surgeons in 1a, since in both cases it is discovered that the trajectory of a process already 
underway needs to be altered in order to be completed appropriately.  But that surface similarity 
is misleading.  In the case of 1a, the disruption arises from within the activity being performed 
by the surgeons—it is specifically a surgical problem.  The present scenario, on the other hand, is 
not a plumbing problem or a bricklaying problem or a carpentry problem or a roofing problem.  
It certainly puts all of those activities on hold, but it is internal to none of them.  It is actually a 
problem with an auxiliary activity, the practice of planning and scheduling construction tasks.   
We can expect the contractors to share competence in this auxiliary activity, and it is this 
competence that will serve as the resource they draw on when they reason.  In these ways the 
case is more like 1b, above.  The contractors, with their separate skills, cannot together face a 
problem (at least with respect to house-building) like the one that comes up in 1a.  Any failure of 
intersubjectivity among them all is, almost by definition, not a problem specific to any one of 
their specialties. 
 
2b.  Another sort of disruption of the contractors’ coordination and general cooperation will be 
much harder to overcome by reasoning, and that is one that is provided for neither by their 
primary building skills nor by the auxiliary skills that builders typically possess.  Imagine 
another, less likely, scenario:  one night a pack of wild dogs takes up residence in the unfinished 
house, and in the morning the dogs energetically defend their new territory.  It would be 
surprising indeed if instead of calling in someone with a special skill for handling wild animals, 
the contractors decided to try to reason their way to a solution.  It would be surprising just 
because it isn’t easy to see how anything that they rely on when they build a house “together” 
can guide them in this sort of situation.  Since none of their skills directly address canine 
infestation, they may try to think up alternatives based on some other part of their experience, 
perhaps as pet-owners or hunters or nature-documentary enthusiasts.  How they will assess these 
alternatives is anyone’s guess.  We’ll see later that recourse to reasoning in such a case is not 
merely unhelpful, but can be positively pernicious.  It’s enough here to note that the scenario 
most resembles 1c, above.  The contractors share too little in the way of wild-animal-
management-skills to engage in any useful reasoning about it, just as the surgeons cannot reason 
their way to restored power.  This is not to say, of course, that if they persist they will not 
successfully come up with a way to remove the dogs.  But since their solution will be drawn 
from almost none of the right sort of shared understanding, any effectiveness they enjoy will 
most likely be a matter of luck. 
 Like the case described in 1c, this one seems bizarre, too unlikely.  But any interruption 
that calls on none of the competences of those who work together is bound to seem bizarre.  Our 
preparation normally extends to the sorts of situations we would encounter in the normal course 
of things, but it rarely extends farther.  Precisely the same thing is true about the limits of useful 
reasoning.  
 
Case #3 
 
In cases 1 and 2, the people who are “working together" are related in that they are 
intentionally contributing to some common goal.  We can plausibly say that the surgeons in case 
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1 are not only working together, but further—they are performing the same activity, drawing in 
complementary ways on precisely the same primary skills to achieve their common goal.  The 
builders in case 2 are not so closely inter-related.  They are aiming at a common goal, but they 
are exercising a variety of different primary skills to accomplish that goal.  If we imagine a 
continuum which describes the degree of inter-relatedness between individuals in virtue of the 
skills they are exercising in a given situation, the surgeons in case 1 would represent one 
extreme.  The builders are not quite so inter-related, so they would not occupy the same extreme 
position on the scale. 
Quite far in the direction of the other extreme we find cases that display a much lower 
degree of inter-relation, cases in which the idea of “restoring interrupted coordination” takes on a 
very different quality.  Sometimes, in extraordinary circumstances we find ourselves called 
together to figure out “how to go on” even though until that moment we were only going on 
together in the thinnest possible sense.  It may be, for example, that we discover that we have a 
common interest in addressing something that appears to pose a common threat to our very 
different, barely related projects. 
  
3a.  Imagine a modern American city in the grip of a crime wave.  Until the crime wave struck, 
the residents of the city went about their separate aims without much sense that they were 
contributing to a common goal.  Suppose that these citizens do not know much about each other, 
have little contact, have little interaction and strive for highly individualized goals.  But now that 
they “face a common threat,” many of the residents realize that at some level there has been a 
common goal all along.  For beneath all of their uncoordinated pursuits, they now seem to share 
the “project” of living together without fear for their lives or property.  It is entirely possible that 
they never before reflected on this common purpose, never took it as a purpose at all, yet they 
now feel that their efforts have been interrupted, and they wish for a return to the civil order and 
harmony that they had been taking for granted. 
 The question we need to ask is:  do the residents of the city have enough in common to 
reason fruitfully about this problem, given the fact that it interrupts not something they were 
doing together, but a kind of order that allowed them to do separate, virtually unrelated things in 
peace?  As in the other cases, the answer to that question depends on what they have in common 
and how the interruption relates to what they have in common.  We might want to say that the 
citizens have a competence in living together peacefully, but that competence may amount to 
nothing more than the ability each has to mind her own business.  In other words they are 
interrupted not in what they do together as much as in the harmony created by each one’s 
willingness to leave others to their own devices.  If that is all they have in common, it seems to 
supply few of the resources necessary for reasoning together about a crime wave.  They were not 
involved in joint crime-fighting, or even crime-prevention—except perhaps insofar as a general 
rule enjoining everyone to mind his own business tends to lead to low crime rates.  Case 3a then, 
is like 1c and 2b—one in which those affected have too little in common to address, by reasoning 
together, the sort of “interruption” which has come up. 
 This is not to say that the citizens will not talk things over, nor even that they will try to 
come up with alternatives that they assess with reasons.  We noted this earlier in case 2b—the 
builders may try to reason together about how to evict the dogs.  But whether we’re talking about 
evicting dogs or reducing crime, the fact remains that, as non-experts in these fields, the builders 
and residents will spend their time most effectively if they restrict their reasoning to a subsidiary 
question:  Who should we call about this? 
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 Since we do indeed exchange reasons about all sorts of things in all sorts of situations, 
especially about things like crime, the conclusion we’re approaching may seem too restrictive.  
Our reasoning about such things even seems successful at times.  We decide to get tough on 
crime or to increase the size and scope of our police forces, focus on prevention, change our 
laws, and so on.  But the point isn’t that we cannot make up, rank, and implement conclusions 
drawn from our own imaginations.  It is that our joint reasoning in such cases cannot be any 
better than our joint competence—and that is quite low.  Our best solutions in such situations are 
selected not by those affected by them, but by experts we trust.  If we ever do appear to reason 
ourselves to a conclusion in such a case, the implementation of which actually appears to solve 
our problem, we should consider the possibility that we got very lucky.  (We should also 
consider the very real possibility that the solution will lead to new, unexpected problems.)  The 
wrong tool, in the wrong hands, sometimes does the job, or seems to.  But such luck comes with 
real costs, as we will see below.   
  
3b.  Consider the growing international concern about “global warming.”  Global warming 
threatens us, if it is a threat, in way very different from a crime wave.  Scientists still disagree 
about both the extent and causes of global warming.  Despite the growing worry, we do not even 
have a reliable diagnosis of the problem.  Thus it is not clear whether or not global warming is 
yet affecting anyone’s life.  Nevertheless, in the eyes of many, global warming promises to be a 
genuine, large-scale threat in the future.  It is also thought by many to be the result of processes 
that are difficult to halt—if we wait until we are unambiguously suffering the effects of global 
warming, it might well be too late to do anything about it.  Clearly there is plenty of room for 
further scientific study and reasoning on the part of specialists.  But could anything come from 
the attempt to reach a consensus among those affected or potentially affected by global 
warming?  Even the nominal task inter-relatedness of the inhabitants of our hypothetical city 
seems thick in comparison to that of the inhabitants of the whole planet.  So far, global warning 
doesn’t interrupt anything we’re doing together, though it threatens to interrupt everything that 
everyone is doing. 
 In cases like this one, even more so than in cases like 1c, 2b, and 3a, our reasoning 
doesn’t have much of a foothold at all.  We simply do not all have enough in common, enough of 
the same, relevant expertise and competences, to devise and assess useful alternatives. 
 This is not to say that we shouldn’t talk about large-scale environmental problems or 
threats.  It is not to suggest that there is nothing we can do in concert.  For one thing, we can take 
it as an obligation to learn as much as we can from scientists and other specialists, and to educate 
others about what we learn.  We might well think of ourselves as obliged to build up as much 
intersubjectivity as possible in these ways.  But the path to expertise, competence, and 
intersubjectivity is paved with training, practice, study, apprenticeship, immersion in a tradition 
or way of doing something.  Reasoning together, on its own, cannot bring about any of this—it 
first gets its foothold once all of this is already in place. 
To believe that exchanging and assessing reasons together can create competence and 
intersubjectivity where there was too little before is to treat our powers of articulation as if they 
were almost magical.  It is as if we could imbue our words with the ability to inculcate 
understanding in someone else.  But reasoning together can only bridge a gap in our shared 
understanding if that gap is very small compared to what we share. 
 The cases we have just reviewed show us something of great importance about the range 
of effective joint reasoning.  What makes such reasoning effective is the availability of certain 
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resources which we have at our disposal only when we are already engaged (or prepared to be 
engaged) together in some endeavor, and when that which interrupts us falls within the sphere of 
the competence we’re exercising or some other which we share.  Reasoning together in a fruitful 
way depends upon our existing shared practice, shared knowledge, and shared competence.  
Under the right conditions, reasoning together can restore that intersubjectivity.  Under almost no 
circumstances can reasoning together create that intersubjectivity where it does not already exist.   
 
 
The Harm in Trying 
 
A natural response to the foregoing would be to suppose that even if reasoning together 
cannot get a foothold in some circumstances, there’s no harm in trying.  Perhaps we’re even 
obligated, in very important situations, to try reasoning together, even if we know it is a long 
shot.  If there’s even a chance it could work, we might think, shouldn’t we give it a try?  But 
matters are not that simple.  There is indeed a price to pay when we try to reason beyond the 
reach of argumentation, and unfortunately, the more successful the wrong kind of reasoning 
seems to be, the higher the price we pay. 
 Imagine a scenario in which, as we have claimed, the participants have no business trying 
to solve their problem by reasoning together.  The house builders in case 2b present a good 
example.  If the builders should persist in trying to figure out how to evict the wild dogs through 
reasoning together, one of two possible results will follow.  Either they will settle on a 
conclusion that, once implemented, works, or they will settle on and implement one that doesn’t 
work.  In the latter case the obvious price is frustration and lost time, and perhaps a worse 
problem than that with which they began (perhaps they only enrage the dogs, for example).  In 
the former case, where the builders seem to succeed, the price can be higher, if more difficult to 
detect—they may do lasting harm to their reasoning skills.  Since the builders have, by 
stipulation, no expertise in dealing with wild dogs, we have to view their success as a matter of 
luck.  When reasoners enjoy apparent success after drawing on inadequate or inappropriate 
intellectual or practical resources, they may develop and reinforce a number of bad habits.  First 
of all, they may stop wondering about whether or not they do indeed have the appropriate 
competences.  Further, they may even begin to lose sight of the whole distinction between 
appropriate and inappropriate expertise.  They may thus fall into the kind of rationalism 
described by Oakeshott (1991)—they begin to expect reasoning to be able to solve any problem 
at all, no matter what its provenance, no matter who the reasoners.  Again, insofar as such 
“loose-cannon” reasoning leads them to unambiguous failures, the development of these bad 
habits is inhibited.  It is the apparent success that brings about the unfortunate positive 
feedback—seemingly successful ungrounded reasoning obscures the distinction between 
grounded and ungrounded reasoning. 
 Can such reasoning be genuinely, rather than merely apparently, successful?  Is success 
in reasoning to be measured purely by whether or not the projected goal is met?  The dogs are 
removed from the site, but is that all that counts?  The answer is that it depends a great deal on 
what happens next.  We surely won’t call it a complete success if the solution they choose 
happens to remove the dogs but also leads to other problems they didn’t have before.  Of course 
those further problems may be very difficult to discern, since they may not arise in the form of a 
new canine infestation.  But let’s imagine some easily detected, unfortunate “side-effects” that 
follow from their poorly-reasoned solution.  Suppose they decide to shoot the dogs.  Suppose 
their shots harm some of their own construction equipment or some part of the structure erected 
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so far.  Perhaps they will face legal trouble for violating laws against discharging firearms within 
city limits, or for being cruel to animals.  Perhaps they will have to deal with frightened or angry 
neighbors.  Perhaps there will be injuries.  Perhaps the builders will be fired for harming the 
reputation of their employer.  On the one hand, none of these consequences can change the fact 
that the dogs have been eliminated—the wish that motivated the reasoning has been fulfilled.  
But on the other hand, their inadvisable reasoning has created new crises, crises which they may 
also decide to address by reasoning together. 
 Now we have an unhappy cycle—inadvisable reasoning, reinforced by some apparent 
success, leads to new crises to be addressed by more inadvisable reasoning, while the very 
distinction between being qualified to engage in such reasoning and being unqualified is 
increasingly effaced.  This cycle represents serious damage to our everyday competence of 
knowing when reasoning is warranted.  Reasoning itself comes to seem less and less like a way 
of repairing small gaps in intersubjectivity, and more and more like an approach to crisis 
management (aimed at the crises it brings about).  The very idea of skill, competence, expertise, 
becomes obscured, perhaps lost.  (For related thoughts see Campolo and Turner, 2002.) 
 Bad reasoning leads to poor conclusions, more bad reasoning, damaged skills, a spiral of 
degraded judgment, and, following the loss of the very idea of competence, the loss of 
competence itself.  Of course all of this doesn’t happen at once.  It happens gradually, almost 
unnoticeably.  But if we are correct so far, the stakes are quite high when we decide whether or 
not to engage in reasoning together. 
 Reasoning together in the absence of the proper resources leads to grief in the particular 
case at hand.  But further, when it becomes habitual, it destroys our competence at detecting 
when reasoning would be inappropriate.   As with any of our skills, poor practice leads to 
diminished abilities.    
 
 
Generality and Distortions 
 
 In mundane situations, mature reasoners with healthy reasoning skills are usually 
competent to make a judgment about whether the best results will come from reasoning together, 
appealing to an expert, or following some other strategy.  However, in some very important 
cases, just when we feel most compelled to resort to reasoning together, this competence fails us.  
Those cases are typically ones that involve very abstract philosophical questions or contentious 
moral, social, or political issues and problems.  For it is in these sorts of cases that we often lack 
the resources to reason together effectively. 
 We can begin to understand what accounts for this perplexing state of affairs if we 
recognize that our assessments of a) what endeavor we are engaged in at any given moment, b) 
how closely we’re working with others, and c) the nature of the “interruption” we face, are 
highly changeable and influenced by many factors.  They are, in essence, descriptions that we 
give to ourselves, and like any descriptions, the form they take depends a great deal on our 
purposes, needs, interests, beliefs, plans, and much more.  This much begins to be clear in case 3 
above, where the “common threat” posed by the crime wave creates a sense of solidarity which 
is not based on much shared understanding or competence.  It is at least possible that the city’s 
residents will get fooled—they could end up believing that they have far more in common than 
they really do.  If that happened, they might also end up believing that they are far closer to 
satisfying the conditions necessary for effective reasoning than they actually are. 
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 To get a better sense of the vagaries of these assessments, the ones upon which our 
judgments about whether or not to reason together are based, we can look at a more robust, yet 
oversimplified scenario.  For example, on a farm where groups of people are performing many 
different tasks, a casual survey might reveal that those pulling weeds view their activity as 
largely distinct from that of the pepper-pickers, and vice versa.  But if it were announced that 
everyone currently engaged in “gardening” could have the rest of the day off, we might find that 
in this context members of the two groups feel that they have something in common.  The 
announcement leads them to shift their description of how much they have in common.  This 
shift in description can work the opposite way as well.  The fellow feeling of all the “gardeners” 
may evaporate the moment it is announced that only those picking peppers are to be given a raise 
in pay.  Now extend the example a bit:  imagine that a run of bad weather leaves the farm 
flooded.  In this case, the members of the two groups have a mutual interest in discovering some 
remedy.  They have something in common, and this may create in them a willingness to think of 
themselves as engaged in the same endeavor.  Their sense of inter-relatedness has shifted,  
increased, in the face of a common threat.  Consider another variation:  imagine that at a certain 
point the demand for peppers drops dramatically.  In this context, pepper-pickers are alone in 
their fear for their jobs, worries about the markets, etc.  They may well have a decreased sense of 
inter-relatedness, of commonality. 
 It is important to realize about the farmers that as their sense of solidarity waxes and 
wanes, the actual resources available to them in the form of shared understanding remain fairly 
stable.  The farmers are either like the surgeons working in closely-inter-related ways, or they are 
like the builders, carrying out their distinct, loosely-related tasks.  What they have in common, 
the competences they actually share, change much more slowly than their level of fellow-feeling.  
They are, at some momentary peak of solidarity, no more equipped to reason together than when 
they feel no inter-relatedness at all—though in the former mood they may be much more 
motivated to try to reason together. 
 Certain kinds of interruptions can make us feel as if we have more in common than we 
do, but the dynamic also works in the opposite direction—the sense of solidarity we enjoy at a 
given moment shapes how we perceive the “event” which interrupts what we’re doing, shapes 
our judgment about whether or not our common competences contain the resources required to 
overcome the interruption.  It’s a sort of interpretive circle. 
 If the above picture of reasoning makes sense, and if we do find ourselves in the sort of 
interpretive circle described here, then it takes few words to get at the nature of the worry I have 
about our well-intentioned appeals to more general common ground. 
  
 
Strategic Ascent 
 
 Our assessments of our relationship to others, the interruptions we face, etc., are not only 
subject to accidental changes—we try to change them whenever we suggest that disputants move 
to more general, common ground.  Part of our goal when we make such a suggestion is to create 
a greater sense of solidarity than the dispute allowed.  If we can see ourselves as really working 
toward the same ends, engaged in the same endeavor, committed to the same principles, then our 
disagreement represents not a clash between disparate world-views, but rather a quarrel from 
within a certain shared practice and tradition.  From this new perspective, it is hoped, we can see 
that, at least to some extent, we stand on common ground—fuller agreement may eventually be 
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possible. 
 When this move is used as a corrective to counter overly polarized or politicized 
positions, then it implicitly involves the claim that there are more resources for reasoning 
together than we had realized.  If that claim is true, then this maneuver can be very helpful—it 
allows us to ground our reasoning on a more broadly shared set of commitments, beliefs, and 
competences.  On the other hand, this claim can be made mistakenly and in those cases it is a 
threat to our reasoning competence.  If you convince me that we have more in common than we 
appear to, then I might be more inclined to try reasoning together.  But if you’re wrong, if we do 
not in fact have enough in common for reasoning to be effective, then you’ve put your reasoning 
skills and mine at risk.  For we will become accustomed to reasoning together where we have no 
business doing so, and that’s a habit that reinforces itself in the ways described above. 
 Then again, it is worth recognizing that you might knowingly try to deceive me into 
believing that we have more in common than we really do.  If I enter into poorly grounded 
reasoning with you, I may become vulnerable to your strategic sophistry.  I will believe in the 
integrity of our reasoning process and I will believe in the legitimacy of the conclusion we reach 
together, yet in all of this I will have been tricked.  We do not have to go far to find examples of 
this sort of manipulation:  the manager tries to foster a sense of solidarity between herself and 
her employees so that none of them seriously considers organizing or joining a union; the 
multinational oil company tries to convince members of the public that it shares their concern 
about the environment in order to head off demands for tougher regulations, and so on.   
 Will not some of the disputants addressed in the examples with which we began feel that 
they have been tricked in this way?   Pro-lifers will find that if they accept Dworkin’s claim that 
the real argument is about how to honor the sanctity of life, they will be maneuvered into a 
distinctly pro-choice corner.  After all, Dworkin eventually explains, everyone should be able to 
decide how to honor the sanctity of life in her own way—it’s at bottom a question of religious 
freedom.  Likewise, the researcher who favors using animals as test subjects will find that with 
his acceptance of the notion that animals have interests worth protecting, he is ushered quite far 
in the direction of an anti-animal-testing stance.  After all, if animals have any interests worth 
protecting, DeGrazia claims, then “all parties can endorse and support the goal of finding ways 
to eliminate animal subjects’ pain, distress, and suffering.”      
 As we can see, the appeal to a more general, shared understanding is a risky (though 
sometimes valuable) move.  When the appeal is sincere, he who makes it claims to have an 
accurate assessment of the degree to which the resources required for reasoning together are 
present, and that is a bold claim.  We are probably in a position to make this claim sometimes, 
especially when not directly party to the controversy or discussion at hand.  But in all cases we 
should be careful to signal that the appeal is highly provisional, tentative, even experimental.  
Otherwise it is either foolhardy or dishonest, and in either case it threatens our reasoning skills. 
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